Blackburn: Fear, Guilt, Pride, Respect | Ethics: A Very Short Introduction

Simon Blackburn, as the author of Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, explores various fundamental concepts and emotional responses within the ethical environment, including fear, guilt, pride, and respect. His work aims to confront what he believes "really bothers people about the subject," primarily "the many causes we have to fear that ethical claims are a kind of sham".

Blackburn discusses these concepts in the following ways:

• Fear:

  • He introduces his book by highlighting the prevalent fear that ethical claims are a kind of sham, associating this apprehension with notions like relativism, scepticism, and nihilism. These ideas can "seep into the moral environment," changing expectations and often leading to cynicism and paralysis.
  • Blackburn also illustrates how societies can be permeated by fear, citing the Nazi climate's fear for racial purity, which allowed for horrifying events like the Holocaust.
  • When discussing the Euthyphro dilemma, he notes Kant's argument that genuine moral motivation is corrupted if actions are performed out of fear of punishment or other incentives, rather than out of respect for the moral law.
  • He also points to the fear that, if suicide or euthanasia were legitimate options, vulnerable individuals might be pressured to accept them by others who stand to benefit from their death. This highlights a societal fear of negative consequences arising from allowing certain practices.

• Guilt:

  • Blackburn explains that the ethical environment profoundly shapes our emotional responses, including our sense of guilt and shame. These are continuously adjusted by events and our relationships with others.
  • He discusses how powerful institutions, such as the Church, can use the control of people's sense of shame and guilt as an instrument of power, even when individual clerics are sincerely concerned about parishioners' sins.
  • Blackburn observes a human tendency to "relentlessly take responsibility," stating that "we would prefer to be guilty than unlucky," suggesting that people often choose to feel guilt rather than acknowledge the role of luck in their moral standing.
  • The problem of free will and determinism also touches upon guilt, as the idea that actions are causally determined challenges the basis of moral responsibility and, by extension, blame and guilt. He also notes instances where people may have guilt feelings (e.g., about sex) that they consciously judge as irrational, describing this as internal conflict.

• Pride:

  • Pride is identified as one of the emotional responses determined by the ethical environment. Individuals seek lives that enable them to appear admirable and often wish to conceal their weaknesses, indicating a concern for how they are perceived.
  • Blackburn points out that the realization that human standards of conduct are of "our own making" and that we "legislate them for ourselves" can "energize us to defend ourselves" and be a source of pride, rather than leading to corrosive scepticism.
  • He also suggests that increased societal sensitivity to environmental issues, sexual difference, and gender equality can be seen as "small, hard-won, fragile, but undeniable causes of pride".
  • From a Kantian perspective, Blackburn notes that our capacity to act in accordance with moral imperatives gives us a "fundamental title to respect and self-respect," and that "we are proud of our reasonings". The utility of the "institution" of promise-keeping, for example, gives a "boost to our respect for the norms" and is "a point we can be proud of".

• Respect:

  • The ethical environment shapes our understanding of what is "due to us, and what is due from us, as we relate to others," which is foundational to the concept of respect.
  • Blackburn contrasts the "godlike vision" of an unchallengeable leader (as in the Nazi climate) with an ethical climate that would foster mutual respect.
  • He highlights Plato's Euthyphro dilemma, arguing that God's commands are moral because they are inherently right, not simply because God commands them. True virtue, in this context (and as interpreted by Kant), involves acting out of respect for a rule itself, rather than out of fear or self-interest.
  • Respect for persons is a crucial Kantian theme, where rational beings are to be treated as "ends in themselves," never merely as means. This entails acknowledging their autonomy and offering reasons to which they can assent. Blackburn sees this as a core ethical demand that is perhaps "more practicable than remembering to love each other".
  • The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, cited by Blackburn, explicitly states that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood," underpinning a universal demand for respect and non-discrimination.
  • In the context of relativism and multiculturalism, Blackburn argues that opposing oppressive practices (e.g., female genital mutilation) in the name of universal human rights is not simply "imposing" Western standards but often involves "cooperating with the oppressed and supporting their emancipation," implying a universal demand for respect for human dignity.
  • He suggests that the act of presenting reasons for one's actions implies a hope for others to recognize their permissibility, thereby seeking "justification from the common point of view". A lack of concern for this common point of view indicates a failure to show respect for others' perspectives.
  • Blackburn ultimately asserts that "dignity is better than humiliation" and that the "attempt to find a common point of view is better than manipulative contempt for it". He notes that increased societal sensitivity to difference is a cause for pride, reflecting a growth in respect for diverse individuals and groups.

Blackburn's overall metaethical stance, known as quasi-realism, suggests that while moral judgments might be projections of our attitudes (rather than reflecting mind-independent moral facts), this does not mean they are erroneous or baseless. Instead, our "projected moral sensibilities" allow us to judge moral utterances as true or false within our ethical framework, emphasizing the deep-seated and indispensable nature of these moral sentiments and practices in human life.

Note: The above content is extracted from Ethics: A Very Short Introduction by Simon Blackburn with the help of Google's Notebook LM